



EUROPEANIZING SPACE: HOW THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION FORMULATES AND 
INSTUMENTALIZES EU IDENTITY AND INTERESTS IN EARTH ORBIT 
Jay W. Morgan 
A thesis submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Political 




Donald D. Searing 
Robert M. Jenkins  















































Jay W. Morgan: Europeanizing Space: How the European Commission Formulates and 
Instrumentalizes EU Identity and Interests in Earth Orbit 
(Under the direction of Donald D. Searing) 
 
In space, as in terrestrial contexts, the European Union does not behave like other actors on 
the world stage. Constructivism in international relations posits that actors’ identities shape their 
interests and behavior. Role theory provides an explanatory link between actors’ behavior and 
role conceptions. Through an inductive analysis of European Commission space policy 
documents, I argue that EU interests and strategy in space are shaped by its meta role identities 
as a civilian power and ‘global player’.  The EU’s space competencies are recently acquired. 
Previously, European space policy was solely the province of national governments and 
intergovernmental cooperation. I examine the supranationalization of space policy within the EU 
through a discursive institutionalist framework and find that the Commission has consistently 
pursued a strategy to legitimate the EU as the primary actor in European space policy. 
Furthermore, the Commission instrumentalizes space policy as a lever to drive European 
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INTRO AND BACKGROUND 
Services from space systems have become indispensable in myriad military and commercial 
contexts. Companies and countries across the world rely on satellites in Earth orbit for 
communication, navigation and positioning services, and Earth observation for purposes ranging 
from weather prediction to military intelligence to improving agricultural yields. Spacefaring 
powers such as the US and EU therefore have designated their space assets and associated 
ground systems as critical infrastructure (Golston and Baseley-Walker 2015; Slann 2016; Tortora 
2015), meaning they are essential to the functioning of a modern society. The advent of satellite 
megaconstellations fueled by the growing commercial space industry means that the economic 
benefits from the space domain and its associated political salience will only increase in the 
coming years. 
Beginning in the 1960s with the European Space Research Organisation (ESRO) and the 
European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO), which merged in 1975 into the 
European Space Agency (ESA), ‘Europe’ in various constellations became a space power 
alongside the US and USSR. The technical complexity and high cost of space activity presented 
a straightforward functionalist case for resource-pooling and cooperation among the smaller 
European states, which could not match the capacities of the superpowers. European efforts in 
space proceeded parallel to the larger project of European integration, remaining largely based 
on intergovernmental cooperation. Following the Treaties Maastricht and Amsterdam, the EU, 





policy. The Treaty of Lisbon grants the EU competency to set space policy on the supranational 
level, which I lay out in more detail in my discussion of the Union’s institutional framework. 
Following Commission initiative, the EU has used its new competencies to develop flagship 
space programs, which the Union owns and operates. My focus in this paper is how the EU’s 
space capabilities relate to its conceptions of security, specifically via the concepts of autonomy 
and competitiveness. 
With the new capabilities provided by expanding space systems also come new 
vulnerabilities. Spacefaring powers’ reliance on assets in Earth orbit for critical services exposes 
them to dramatic military and/or economic damage if those systems are disrupted or degraded 
either through accident or intentional action. As space becomes ever more ‘congested, contested, 
and competitive’ (National Security Space Strategy 2011), space powers will take active 
measures to secure their interests in Earth orbit. The EU has chosen a strategy of investing in 
new space capabilities and promoting global norms of conduct for space activity. Constructivist 
theory argues the strategies states/polities adopt reflect their identities, in that identity shapes and 
defines how they conceive of their interests. Wendt (1999) proposes four ‘objective’ national 
interests: physical survival, autonomy, economic well-being, and collective self-esteem (p. 235-
7). States/polities interpret objective interests through their identities and develop appropriate 
strategies to achieve their definition of survival, autonomy, etc. Applying role theory to the EU’s 
space security strategy, I argue that the EU’s role identities as a ‘global player’ and a civilian 
power shape its understanding of Wendt’s four interests and the means it uses to achieve them. 
Namely, these role identities lead to an emphasis on independent capabilities or autonomy in 





Autonomy and competitiveness are key framing concepts in the Commission’s articulation of 
the EU’s interests and its strategy to meet them. Autonomy in regard to space means maintaining 
independent launch capabilities and key space services like global positioning and earth 
observation. To provide for the physical security of its satellites, the EU and its members are also 
increasing their investment into space situational awareness capabilities (discussed in more detail 
in the next section), but they are still largely dependent on the United States in this area. The 
Commission frames space capabilities as a driver for autonomy in other areas, especially security 
and defense. The goal of the Commission’s new Directorate General for Defence Industry and 
Space is to exploit synergies between civilian and defense space capabilities. Competitiveness, 
meanwhile, carries economic and industrial policy connotations. The Commission’s stated goal 
in the Space Strategy for Europe (2016) is to ‘foster a globally competitive and innovative 
European space sector,’ and to maximize the subsequent societal benefits from space services. 
Turning to the institutional level, we can also view the Commission’s framing of space 
security as a discursive strategy to gain more policy competencies in intra-EU power struggles 
with the other institutions and member states. The Commission employs the framing concepts of 
autonomy and competitiveness to justify more competencies for itself in space policy. With the 
growing relevance of space to security, the Commission legitimizes the Europeanization of space 
policy under the need to ‘rationalize’ and ‘streamline’ EU space policy under one roof. Only 
through centralization and supranationalization, the Commission argues, can the EU maintain 
and its autonomy and competitiveness in space, thereby achieving both its material and 








Space Security encompasses a variety of definitions, including “the aggregate of all technical, 
regulatory and political means that aims to achieve unhindered access and use of outer space 
from any interference as well as aims to use space for achieving security on Earth” (Antoni 2020, 
p. 15). Mayence (2010), meanwhile, divides the concept into three pillars: 
Outer space for security: the use of space systems for security and defense purposes 
Security in outer space: how to protect space assets and systems against natural and/or 
human threats or risks and ensure a sustainable development of space activities 
Security from outer space: how to protect human life and Earth’s environment against 
natural threats and risks from outer space. (p. 35)  
 
The use of outer space for security and security in outer space are the two most relevant facets of 
space security for my purposes, as these concern the use and protection of assets in Earth orbit. 
The European Commission states “Security forms an integral part of European Space Policy,” 
making explicit mention of space-based assets “critical to ensuring security on Earth” and the 
need to protect those assets (European Commission 2021). It also mentions the dual-use 
(civilian/military) nature of space infrastructure, making it part of “the development of an 
innovative and competitive European Defence Technological and Industrial Base” (European 
Commission 2021). Therefore, in addition to the security provided by space systems and the 
need to protect them in turn, European space policy also contains an economic element: the 
development and protection of strategically useful industrial capabilities. The physical space 
infrastructure and its means of production therefore provides security on Earth. The normative 
aspect of the Commission’s strategy, meanwhile, is geared towards protecting satellites and the 
broader orbital environment, which some define as space sustainability.  
Space sustainability falls under the broader umbrella of security in space and is largely 





Defense Department’s Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC) track over 21,000 pieces of 
debris in Earth orbit.1 They estimate there are over “500,000 pieces of debris the size of a marble 
or larger” with millions more “so small they can’t be tracked.”2 Space debris in orbit travels 
around 17,500 mph, meaning that a collision with even a small piece of debris could cause 
significant damage to a satellite. Debris includes satellites which have passed the end of their 
service lives, spent launch components from multistage rockets, and naturally occurring 
meteoroids. Collisions between objects in space generate more debris, much of which remains in 
orbit. China’s 2007 antisatellite missile test and the 2009 collision of a defunct Russian satellite 
with an active US commercial communications satellite added about 5,000 pieces of debris to the 
catalogue together.3  
The rise of commercial space actors and new national space powers threatens to make the 
problem worse. Constellations of small satellites like SpaceX’s Starlink will exponentially 
increase the number of active satellites around Earth. There are currently about 2,200 active 
satellites in orbit.4 Starlink alone has approval from the Federal Communications Commission to 
launch up to 12,000 satellites, with 1,584 planned for the first phase over the next two years.5 
That is why national and international authorities have rushed to develop debris mitigation 
 
1 “Space Debris and Human Spacecraft.” NASA.gov. NASA, September 26, 2013. 
https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/news/orbital_debris.html. 
 
2“Space Debris.” NASA. 
 
3 “Space Debris.” NASA. 
 
4 “UCS Satellite Database.” Reports/Multimedia. Union of Concerned Scientists, December 16, 2019. 
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/satellite-database.  
 
5 Stephen Clark, “SpaceX’s Starlink Network Surpasses 400-Satellite Mark after Successful Launch,” News Archive, 






guidelines and begun efforts to explore active debris reduction. Monitoring and governing the 
orbital environment require the technical and political innovation in space situational awareness. 
Space Situational Awareness (SSA): SSA involves knowing the locations of space objects 
and the ability to predict their future locations. The definition from the White House includes 
“characterization of space objects and their operational environment,” which also involves 
discerning the capabilities and intent of objects in space based on their type and operator.6 SSA 
is critical both for the physical security of satellite infrastructure and for norm enforcement. 
Spacepower is the ability to achieve goals in space and to use space to influence others. 
Bowen (2020) defines spacepower as “‘the use of outer space’s military and economic 
advantages for strategic ends’, and a ‘space power’ is an entity that uses outer space for its 
political objectives” (p. 22). It is the conceptual equivalent of terrestrial theories of airpower or 
seapower. Space, like the air or water cannot be fortified or held and does not have terrain in the 
same way land does. Many scholars (Bowen 2017, 2020; Dolman 2002; Klein 2019) make direct 
comparisons to theories of maritime power from thinkers like Corbett and Mahan. Some, like 
Dolman (2002), dub power-political competition in space ‘astropolitics’ to differentiate the 
environment from geopolitical competition on Earth. Bowen (2015, 2020) argues that 
competition among space powers is merely ‘a continuation of Terran politics by other means.’ 
My goal in this paper is to investigate how the Commission conceptualizes and instrumentalizes 
EU spacepower, thereby defining its character as a space power.  
 
6 “Space Policy Directive-3, National Space Traffic Management Policy.” Presidential Memoranda. The White 






CHAPTER 1: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Theoretical explanations for European space activity are readily available in international 
relations (IR) and European studies literature. Bolton (2009) takes a neorealist approach to 
explain transatlantic competition between the US Global Positioning System (GPS) and 
European Galileo systems in the late 1990s, arguing that Europe’s development of its own 
positioning system demonstrates balancing behavior against the US. Wang (2013) takes a more 
nuanced approach, examining transatlantic competition and cooperation in space with an eye 
towards the shared ‘security community’ between Europe and North America, while developing 
a framework based on rationalist IR theories to explain competition within the alliance. Wang 
argues the US and Europe are more likely to cooperate in space in purely scientific and civilian 
contexts, but as both view space as a vital strategic interest in both economic and defense 
contexts, competition between the allies is more likely in these areas. Following a realist logic, 
Wang’s model suggests the two sides will choose competition if cooperation would conflict with 
a fundamental interest like autonomy.  
The ‘astropolitical’ tradition (Bowen 2020; Dolman 2002; Klein 2019) based on analogies to 
sea and airpower theory, also contains many of the same underpinnings of realism: rational 
actors with fixed interests and often an emphasis on material ‘hard power’ military capabilities. 
Distinctions arise from the geographic determinism inherent in the geopolitical tradition and its 
astropolitical variant, as well as the theater/context specific focus on a particular environment 





Explanations for European cooperation, and later integration in space usually stem from a 
liberal intergovernmentalist foundation. Given the expense and technical complexity of space 
activity, there is an economic logic for small and medium powers to pool resources and develop 
specialized divisions of labor (Al-Ekabi and Mastorakis 2015). Institutionally, 
intergovernmentalism has been the predominant framework for European efforts in space, 
defining both the ESA and its predecessors (Algeri 2015). As discussed in the next section, many 
of the EU’s space systems and programs, aside from the flagship programs Galileo, Copernicus, 
and EGNOS are owned and controlled by the member states and managed either independently 
or through intergovernmental coordination. 
The economic logic of integration in space policy also lends itself well to neofunctionalist 
explanations. Neofunctionalism theorizes an inexorable pressure towards deeper integration and 
supranationalization with the growth of economic interdependencies (Wiener and Diez 2009, p. 
48-9). Wouters and Hansen (2015) compare integration in space policy and industry within the 
EU to other policy areas like agriculture and energy. They argue similar economic pressures of 
economic interdependence are present in space policy which led to integration and 
supranationalization of other policy competencies.  
Rationalist theories with their assumptions of fixed and rational interests have a blind spot to 
the role of identity in interest formation. For those kinds of questions, a constructivist framework 
is much more fitting. Examples of application of constructivist methods to European space 
security include Kolovos’ (2019) examination of how the Western European Union developed a 
common space security culture and Hoerber’s (2018) study of framing in European space policy. 
In this paper, I seek to investigate some of the exceptional aspects of the EU’s approach to space 





characteristics. To do so, I employ constructivist assumptions through a discourse analysis of EU 
documents, primarily from the Commission. While this method illuminates aspects a rationalist 
or materialist analysis would miss, it can overstate the causal importance of discourse itself. 
Constructivism argues that state interests are not materially determined, but socially 
constructed. Borrowing from George and Keohane, Wendt (1999) proposes four core ‘national 
interests’: physical survival, autonomy, and economic well-being and collective self-esteem (p. 
235). He argues, “The form these interests take will vary with states' other identities, but the 
underlying needs are common to all states and must somehow be addressed if states are to 
reproduce themselves” (Wendt 1999, p. 235). I use Wendt’s four national interests as a basis to 
understand the EU’s interests in space. Although the EU itself is not a state, and Wendt himself 
would not apply his national interest framework to a non-state body, in examining policy and 
strategy at the supranational level, I argue the EU is state-like enough (or is portrayed by the 
Commission as such) for an examination based on an understanding of national interests. 
Mutschler and Venet (2012) characterize the EU as “an actor under construction in the field of 
space security” (p. 121). My focus lies on the conceptual and rhetorical construction of 
supranational EU identity and interests in space. Materially, much of European space policy, 
particularly in security and defense contexts, continues to be carried out at the national and 
intergovernmental levels. However, as in other policy areas, the EU displays a unique level of 
integration in the transnational space industry within its common market and enjoys an 
exceptional status as a supranational space actor, other space-faring polities being either states or 
intergovernmental bodies like ESA. Later sections of the paper focus on the Commission’s 





Space assets contribute to the EU’s physical security, autonomy, economic well-being, and 
self-esteem by enhancing military capabilities, reducing reliance on external partners, creating 
new industries and markets, and promoting shared prestige in the status of space power. In these 
regards, the EU is unremarkable when compared to other space powers. Differences emerge, as 
Wendt argues, from the EU’s unique identity on the world stage, which has material, 
institutional, and ideological aspects. The EU’s self-conception as a ‘global player’ and a civilian 
power shapes its understanding of its interests in outer space and the means it deems appropriate 
to pursue them.  
As primary source data of the EU’s self-conception, I focus on three Commission strategy 
documents: EU Space Industrial Strategy (2013), Space Strategy for Europe (2016), and A 
Proposal for a Regulation… establishing the space programme of the Union… (2018). These 
three documents are the principal articulations of the Commission’s strategy towards outer space 
since the Treaty of Lisbon, which granted the EU supranational competency in space policy 
under Article 189, entered effect in 2009. I reference reports and other documents from other EU 
institutions such as the Council, Parliament, and European External Action Service when 
relevant, but these two strategy documents and proposed regulation form the backbone of my 
analysis of the Commission’s understanding and presentation of the EU’s role as a space power. 
Evidence confirming a self-conception as a global player is relatively easy to find through 
content analysis of European Commission documents. If the phrase is not used outright 
(European Commission 2016, p. 2; 2018, p. 3), strategy documents and communications often 
feature reference to the EU’s economic weight or appeals for the EU to take “a much stronger 
role on the world stage” (European Commission 2016, p. 11). Establishing the EU’s identity as a 





‘hard power’ frames from EU space policy documents when compared to their equivalents from 
other space powers, such as the United States. To provide a causal connection between identity, 
interest, and policy, I employ role theory. 
Role theory involves the study of how self-conceptions and social perceptions affect actors’ 
identities and behavior within a system. As applied within international relations theory, states 
are typically the actors analyzed. Bengtsson and Elgström (2011) attribute state-like agency to 
the EU in their analysis of role perceptions in EU foreign policy, which I also adopt applied to 
space policy. I employ Harnisch’s (2011) definition of roles for my purposes here: 
“Roles are social positions (as well as a socially recognized category of actors) that are 
constituted by ego and alter expectations regarding the purpose of an actor in an organized 
group…. The position’s function in the group is limited in time and scope and it is 
dependent on the group’s structure and purpose. Whereas some roles are constitutive to the 
group as such, e.g. recognized member of the international community, other roles or role 
sets are functionally specific, e.g. balancer, initiator.” (8) 
 
As Harnisch points out, roles are socially defined and intersubjective, constituted from both self-
conceptions as well as the perceptions of others. Roles can also vary based on geographical or 
policy context in addition to their functional specificity. The complex interplay of self-
conception, perception, and socialization makes causal relationships between an actor’s identity, 
role, and behavior difficult to identify or isolate, with each recurringly influencing the others. I 
propose a simplistic model from Wendt’s (1999) ‘rump materialism’ in which the Commission 
strategically drives the EU to adopt the role of a ‘civilian’ space power in pursuit of fundamental 
material and identity interests.  
Within the international community, the EU conceives and presents itself as a civilian power, 
which I will define in detail shortly. Other actors on the world stage share this perception of the 





legitimacy. My first level of analysis involves exploring how EU’s meta-role as a civilian power 
(as portrayed by the Commission) shapes its context-specific role as a space power.  
Hanns Maull defines civilian powers as having three key attributes: 
a. “the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of 
international objectives; 
b. the concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national 
goals, with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to 
safeguard other means of international interaction; and 
c. a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of 
international management.” (1990, p. 92-93) 
 
Other than the mention of national goals, those criteria fit quite well with the EU’s role 
conception on the world stage. As I show in depth later, the emphasis on international 
cooperation and economic means pair directly with Commission strategy statements, and the 
willingness to develop supranational structures is practically tautological given the EU’s nature. 
Bengtsson and Elgström (2011) refer to the EU as a ‘normative great power,’ combining 
Manners’ (2002) theory of powers which shape the world through norm promotion and setting 
standards of normality with the oft repeated formulation in Commission statements of the EU as 
a ‘global player’, implying world-spanning influence. 
Maull himself demurs from calling the EU a civilian power, preferring instead to refer to it as 
a ‘force’ in international relations (2005). Maull describes EU influence on world affairs as more 
akin to a ‘gravitational pull’ than intentionally applied leverage. The EU “shapes its environment 
through what it is, rather than through what it does” (Maull 2005, p. 778). Maull helpfully 
provides criteria for the meaning of ‘power’ in his scheme: 
“…first, it refers to an actor of some stature in international relations, with substantial 
power resources at its disposal; second, it describes an actor with significant ambition 
(including appropriate strategies) to transform international relations; and third, it denotes 
the specific means, the power resources on which civilian powers can and will draw.” 






In my discussion of the EU’s space capabilities and institutional framework, I argue that after the 
Lisbon Treaty, the Union has agglomerated sufficient resources and expressed ‘significant 
ambition’ on the supranational level to meet Maull’s definition of power, a least in the context of 
outer space. I leave aside a broader discussion of the EU’s actorness in international affairs, 
except to the extent that articulations of the need for new competencies and capabilities are 
relevant to my second level of analysis: the Commission’s discursive use of outer space as a 
lever for Europeanization.  
Asserting that the EU has supranational state-like actorness in space policy begs the question 
of how it got there. The so-called new institutionalist theories are well positioned to explain 
intra-EU power struggles, and with them, institutional change. Vivian Schmidt (2008) outlines 
discursive institutionalism (DI) as a supplementary theory to the existing institutionalisms. DI 
examines the interactions between actors, ideas, and institutions. For my purposes, I employ DI 
to investigate the strategic use of ideas to legitimize and achieve a particular actor’s goals, in this 
case the European Commission seeking increased competencies at the supranational level. As in 
my discussion of interests, I assume a ‘rump rationalism’ in that I view the Commission as a 
power-seeking actor within the EU’s institutional context. I argue the Commission uses space 
policy as a lever for European integration more broadly as other scholars have observed in policy 
areas like energy or agriculture (Jabko 2012). As DI also involves examination of how ideas 
shape interests and motivations, I posit that the Commission pursues its discursive strategy not 
just out of self-interest but from the normative belief that deeper Europeanization is better for the 





CHAPTER 2: EU INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
As in other policy areas in the EU, space policy competences are spread across a variety of 
supranational and intergovernmental institutions as well as among the individual member states. 
The following section is a brief overview of the relevant institutional players in making 
European space security policy. 
Supranational 
European Commission: The EU has gained considerable significance in space, especially 
since the Treaty of Lisbon. Article 189 of the revised Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union grants the Union power to establish its own space policy. Under these auspices, the 
Commission released a Space Strategy for Europe in 2016. Although the EU “may promote joint 
initiatives, support research and technological development and coordinate the efforts needed for 
the exploration and exploitation of space,” Article 189 excludes “any harmonisation of the laws 
and regulations of the Member States.” The European Commission administers the EU’s flagship 
space programs, Galileo/EGNOS (global positioning) and Copernicus (Earth observation), which 
it developed jointly with ESA. In December 2019, the von der Leyen Commission established a 
new Directorate General for Defence Industry and Space (DEFIS) under the Commissioner for 
Internal Market, Thierry Breton. DEFIS manages the new EU Space Program, which in turn 






European Space Agency: ESA is an intergovernmental space agency independent of the EU. 
Its founding members came together to promote scientific cooperation and autonomous 
European access to space. Like NASA, ESA’s goals are promoting scientific research and 
economic use of space for its members. ESA’s convention binds it to only promote space 
research for “exclusively peaceful purposes,” though it has increasingly involved itself in the 
development of dual-use technologies in recent years (Sheenan 2009), and is therefore involved 
in several security-related initiatives like Galileo and Copernicus.  
EU SST: Acting in a coordinating function, the Commission established the EU Space 
Surveillance and Tracking framework through which member states pool their space situational 
awareness (SSA) capabilities and share information. Detecting and tracking objects in space 
requires a diverse and dispersed array of sensors both on Earth and in space. The SSA assets 
themselves remain owned and controlled by national governments, though the information they 
collect is shared and pooled through the EU SST framework. 
EU SatCen: The European Union Satellite Centre is an agency inherited from the Western 
European Union (WEU) in 2002. The WEU was an integral institution in establishing a common 
space security culture in Europe (Kolovos 2019). SatCen provides geospatial intelligence in the 
context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and reports to a governing board 
chaired by the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy (HR/VP). Institutional ties to 
the European External Action Service and oversight by the Political and Security Committee of 






Many EU member states maintain national space programs. National space agencies are 
often independent or organized under ministries for science, industry, or communications. 
National defense ministries of larger member states like France, Germany, Spain, and Italy 
maintain space capabilities for intelligence and communication, sometimes organized under an 
independent space command. Given the expense of space activities European states often pool 
their resources, either through bilateral or multilateral arrangements among themselves or 






CHAPTER 3: EU IDENTITY AND INTERESTS IN SPACE 
Wendt (1999) proposes four objective interests that all states share: physical survival, 
autonomy, and economic well-being and collective self-esteem. The particulars of what survival 
or economic well-being means and their relative priorities vary based on the state’s identity. 
Applying this framework to the EU (although it is not a state), I investigate in this section how 
the EU’s conceptions of its meta-role as a global player and a civilian power apply to its context-
specific role as a space power shape its definitions of Wendt’s four ‘national interests’ in space. 
Drawing on evidence from Commission documents, I show how these role identities imbue the 
EU’s core interests in space with a civilian character focused primarily on economic competition. 
A Civilian View of Security 
Security and defense present themselves as more separate and distinct concepts in European 
policy and scholarly documents than in American discussions of ‘national security.’ Nina 
Remuss from the German Aerospace Center writes: 
“Europe has adopted a broad understanding of the concept of security comprising internal 
security threats such as terrorism and organized crime; environmental threats such as 
deforestation and climate change; natural disasters… and external security threats 
including military aggression in the near abroad.” (Remuss 2015 p. 132) 
 
Thus far, the EU has integrated the use of space for security on the intergovernmental and 
supranational levels through the Satellite Centre and the flagship satellite programs Galileo and 
Copernicus (Darnis, Pasco, and Wohrer 2020). References to the utility of space for security and 
defense in Commission strategy documents focus more on the ‘softer’ security components 




defense (SSE 2016, p. 5, 10). Security in space, that is the security of the space assets 
themselves, remains underdeveloped on the EU level, with the recently implemented EU Space 
Surveillance and Tracking Framework (EU SST) managed by a consortium of member states 
being the primary vehicle for coordinating European SSA capabilities.  
Though EU space assets contribute to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy 
through providing surveillance, communication, and navigation capabilities, like the CFSP itself, 
they remain primarily civilian oriented. The EU frames CFSP missions using its broad definition 
of human security as actions meant to promote stability rather than to project power. As defined 
by the Commission, space assets are critical infrastructure (PwC 2017), however, in terms of 
protecting its space assets, the Union has thus far focused its efforts on debris mitigation and the 
sustainability of the orbital environment. The 2016 EU Space Strategy makes no mention of 
antisatellite weapons or direct military confrontation in space. Although the EU recognizes its 
dependence on space and the need to provide security in space, it “appears determined to do so 
without resorting to the use of military force” (Slann 2016, p. 13). 
Both the predominantly civilian character of EU space assets and the Union’s non-military 
approach to protect them have led to the characterization of the EU as a civilian power in space. 
Mutschler and Venet apply concepts of Europe as a ‘civilizing’ or a normative power from Maull  
(1990) and Manners (2002) to the EU’s approach to security in space (Mutschler and Venet 
2012). In this conception, norms are both the ends and means of the EU’s strategy for security in 
space. The EU seeks to provide for its own security in space “by strengthening the international 
legal system, and by externalizing its domestic norms” (Mutschler and Venet 2012, p. 122). 
Mutschler and Venet also note that the EU has not accompanied its norm promotion with a space 





As a sui generis polity, the EU is a unique actor on the world stage. Some have characterized 
the Union’s external policy as ‘post-Westphalian’ (Sperling 2013), whereby it uses soft power 
means to exert normative influence throughout the world. In recent years, the EU has sought to 
shed its civilian labeling, promising a ‘geopolitical’ approach to world affairs and to ‘learn the 
language of power.’ Since 2016, messaging from all EU institutions has featured the theme of 
‘strategic autonomy’ (EEAS 2016; European Commission 2016) wherein the bloc and its 
members achieve a collective freedom of action by internally expanding their power projection 
capabilities. Space plays a considerable role in EU efforts towards autonomy. Independent space 
capabilities serve as an enabler for other capabilities, such as foreign deployments through the 
Common Security and Defence Policy or fostering domestic high-tech industries (Darnis, Pasco, 
and Wohrer 2020; Polkowska 2020; Tortora and Moranta 2019; Tortora 2015). 
Strategic Autonomy 
Wendt defines autonomy as “the ability of a state-society complex to exercise control over its 
allocation of resources and choice of government” (1999, p. 235). Strategic autonomy is the idea 
that the EU should have freedom of action in its foreign policy, which requires sufficient power 
projection capability and requires a reduction in reliance on outside partners, especially the US. 
It is the overarching frame present in EU foreign and security policy statements, especially since 
the von der Leyen Commission took office. EU strategic autonomy means increased independent 
capabilities at a European level and a kind of ‘shared autonomy’ among the member states. In 
practice, that imposes formal or informal limits on independent action on the national level. 
Other internal tensions within the concept arise on the economic level, where the EU seeks to 
champion European industries without being perceived as protectionist or pursuing autarky. 





development and expansion of economic and military capabilities within Europe to allow the EU 
as a ‘global player’ more freedom of action (EUGS 2016). Proponents of strategic autonomy 
argue that the EU should be able to project power abroad without the constraints imposed by 
external dependencies or the lack of internal capabilities. 
A recent European Parliament report began with the bold assertion that “Without strategic 
autonomy in space, there can be no strategic autonomy on earth,” placing autonomy at the heart 
of EU interests in space (2020, p. 1). Autonomy in space means maintaining independent launch 
capability and satellite production capabilities. These were the focuses of early European space 
cooperation efforts which eventually became ESA. The Ariane launcher and Europe’s Spaceport 
in French Guiana provide the EU with autonomous access to space, and thereby a capability only 
a select few powers possess. Space assets provide a variety of enhanced capabilities for the EU. 
With Galileo and Copernicus, the EU can also provide navigation and earth observation services 
as public goods internationally, allowing other countries and companies alternatives to Russian, 
Chinese, or American space services. Internal commercial and civilian applications include using 
space data to improve farming efficiency or to monitor weather and climate.  
Space systems are inherently dual-use, meaning they can serve either military or civilian 
purposes or both. Positioning satellites can guide cars and missiles. Earth observation satellites 
can track crop yields and troop build-ups. As such, increases in the EU’s civilian space 
capabilities also mean increased defense capabilities. The Commission’s Space Strategy for 
Europe explicitly seeks to expand dual-use synergies (2016, p. 10). By increasing the access of 
military operators to data gathered by civilian space assets and ensuring interoperability between 
civil, commercial, and defense systems, the EU can expand the defense and security benefits 





The EU sees space as a global common, similar to the high seas (EUGS 2016, p. 15, 42). As 
such, it wishes to keep its free use of space as unimpeded as possible. This is where space 
sustainability comes into play. Human activities both unintentional, such as space debris, and 
intentional, like deliberate destruction or damaging of satellite systems, threaten the open-ended 
use of Earth orbit. Therefore, in addition to its relevance to the physical security of satellites, the 
orbital environment also matters for the long-term use of space. As the EU becomes increasingly 
dependent on the benefits its space systems provide, the security of those systems themselves 
becomes crucial to maintaining freedom of action.  
EU autonomy contains an economic element as well. In addition to independent access to 
space, the Commission identifies ‘technological non-dependence’ and ‘security of supply’ as key 
ends of its Space Industrial Policy (2013, p. 7). To the Commission, truly autonomous access to 
and use of space means reducing external dependencies for technological inputs for rocket and 
satellite technologies as well as physical components. In 2013, approximately 60% of the 
electronics in European satellites were imported from the US (European Commission 2013, p. 8). 
Given the sensitive nature of space-related technologies, countries like the US often impose 
export controls, which limit or delay European access to critical components. Therefore, in 
pursuit of broader strategic autonomy as well as economic and security benefits, autonomy in 
space has become an interest onto itself for the EU.  
Economic Prosperity 
The EU sees space as part of the internal market and wants European firms in this field to 
compete on a level playing field. As in other trade policy issues, the EU seeks to foster European 
industry while creating open export markets for European firms. Space technologies are 





controls and limitations of foreign firms’ access to domestic markets. In space, the EU sees an 
opportunity to spur economic activity through public investment and develop and industrial base 
which will be strategically important in the years to come. 
The Commission identifies the prosperity of European citizens and the competitiveness of 
Europe’s space industry internationally as key interests in its Space Strategy. In addition to the 
benefits of space services across the economy, the Commission presents the space industry itself 
as a key interest. 
“Space policy can help boost jobs, growth and investments in Europe. Investing in space 
pushes the boundaries of science and research. Europe has a world-class space sector, 
with a strong satellite manufacturing industry, which captures around 33 % of the open 
world markets, and a dynamic downstream services sector with a large number of SMEs. 
The European space economy, including manufacturing and services, employs over 
230000 professionals and its value was estimated at EUR 46-54 billion in 2014, 
representing around 21% of the value of the global space sector.” (SSE 2016, p. 2)  
 
The Commission argues that Europe’s space industry has grown to a large enough scale that it 
represents a vested economic interest in terms of industrial policy, similar to the role the auto 
industry plays in many countries. Europe’s space industry thereby becomes not just a means to 
achieve the core interest of prosperity but an interest onto itself. As with other sectors, the 
European space industry faces competition in a globalized market. 
The Commission pairs the necessity to support European industry with appeals to prosperity 
and the threat posed by outside competition. 
“In comparison to other space-faring nations, the European institutional market is also 
relatively small…. The European market alone is therefore not sufficient to sustain the 
current level of excellence of the European space industry. In addition, institutional 
markets of most space faring nations are closed to other space faring nations' industry.” 
(Commission Space Industrial Strategy 2013, p. 5-6). 
 
With the European space sector outsized for its domestic market, market access for exports 





broader set of economic interest which drive the EU’s trade policy agenda to open new markets 
and ensure the competitiveness of European goods. 
The prominence of economic interests and actions in the Commission’s space strategy and 
proposals fits well with Maull’s second criterion for civilian power: “the concentration on non-
military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals” (1990, p. 92). As shown above, the 
EU’s economic power carries significant implications of status, and is the main legitimizing 
pillar of its claim to be a global player. These notions are also relevant to Wendt’s final interest, 
collective self-esteem.  
Self-Esteem/Prestige 
As a non-state polity, the EU, particularly in its supranational institutions is particularly 
insecure about its actorness. Appeals for investment in increased material capabilities or 
autonomy also have a social/psychological component in fulfilling a need for status. Belgian 
prime minister and European statesman Paul-Henri Spaak supposedly quipped, “There are only 
two types of states in Europe: small states, and small states that have not yet realized they are 
small.”7 In his remark, we can see a social justification alongside the realist or functionalist 
explanations for cooperation and integration in Europe – a desire for grandeur. Through 
expanding the self to encompass a larger European community, European member states can 
become part of a larger whole and cease being small, insignificant players on the world stage.  
Similarly, beyond the material advantages the EU’s space capabilities provide, they also 
grant the bloc membership to the exclusive club of space powers. Commissioner Thierry Breton 
refers to the EU as “the world’s second space power,” implying it stands only behind the United 
 
7 Attributed but unsourced; Heiko Maas, “Speech by Foreign Minister Heiko Maas: Courage to Stand up for Europe 







States in terms of status in space.8 Being one of the few spacefaring powers in the world fulfills 
the fundamental desire for prestige and helps confirm the EU’s status as a global player. 
Placing the EU as the driver of European space policy is a context-specific reification of a 
shared EU identity, or as the Commission puts it, “An EU space policy could reinforce the 
European identity at international political level” (2013, p. 3). Pursuing and implementing a 
supranational space policy makes the EU not just a collection of spacefaring nations but a space 
power itself, both in its own self-conception and the perceptions of others on the world stage. 
Space also represents another area in which the EU can practice leadership internationally. 
The Commission openly states its ambition for the EU’s space role, writing “The EU should lead 
the way in addressing the challenges posed by the multiplication of space actors, space objects 
and debris” (SSE 2016, p. 11). Here, the EU’s meta role identity as a normative great power, as 
Bengtsson and Elgström (2011) put it, informs its context-specific role in space.  
In terms of its civilian identity, space provides another domain in which the EU can exercise 
normative leadership, as I discuss in detail in the next section. Furthermore, the idealistic 
narratives which surround space exploration and the notion that efforts in space are essentially 
done ‘for all mankind’ fit well with the civilizing aims of a civilian power, providing a kind of 
ontological reassurance in the consistency of its values and material interests.  
Conclusion 
Statements of interest in Commission space strategy documents map on well to Wendt’s four 
national interests. The EU’s interests in space lie in promoting the bloc’s physical security, and 
the security of its space systems themselves, achieving autonomy in space and using space 
 
8 Thierry Breton, “Enhancing Europe’s Space Power,” Blog. European Commission, Dec. 9, 2020, https://ec-europa-
eu.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/commission/commissioners/2019-2024/breton/blog/enhancing-europes-space-power_en. 





capabilities to increase autonomy in other areas, promoting economic prosperity through the 
support of the European space industry, and providing collective prestige for the Union in the 
status of space power. The EU’s role identities as a civilian power and global player shape the 
specific formulations of these interests, emphasizing peace promotion, economic competition, 
and normative leadership. Having examined how the Commission defines EU interests in space, 





CHAPTER 4: EU SPACE STRATEGY 
The previous section investigated how the Commission’s role-conceptions of the EU shape 
its interest definitions. This section details how the meta-roles of global player and civilian 
power shape the EU’s role performance in space, as outlined in Commission strategy documents. 
I argue the EU’s role performance in space demonstrates the application of means deemed 
appropriate for achieving its interests. The EU not only pursues civilian and ‘civilizing’ ends in 
space, but does so through civilian, primarily economic, means, such as norm promotion and 
industrial investment. 
Norm promotion  
The EU promotes norms for safe conduct and good behavior in Earth orbit on the 
international level. If common standards of behavior in space are widely adopted, it both reduces 
the likelihood of conflict in space and addresses the long-term environmental problem posed by 
orbital debris. The most prominent example of the EU’s norm-centric strategy for security in 
space is its proposed Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (CoC). The EU first proposed 
the CoC in 2008 and revised it several times over the next years. The CoC affirms “responsibility 
of states to avoid harmful interference in space and to refrain from activities which would 
generate long-lived space debris” (Mutschler 2015 p. 47). It also includes multiple transparency 
and confidence-building measures designed to reduce the risk of conflict in space such as 
information sharing on space activities, pledges to refrain from “harmful interference with 





2014). Those aspects make the EU’s CoC more than a safety or sustainability measure, but a 
security one as well. 
The EU’s CoC ultimately failed to garner enough international support for adoption. Russia 
and China prefer a formal arms control treaty as the normative framework for security in space. 
The western space powers preferred non-binding guidelines like the CoC. The US chose not to 
endorse the EU’s CoC, though it had no objections to the guidelines in principle. Other nations 
opposed the initiative because they felt they were not included in the process early enough 
(Mutschler 2015, p. 47; Rose 2018,p. 5).  
Even after the CoC’s failure on the international level, norms remain central to the EU’s 
approach to security in space. The 2016 Space Strategy for Europe (SSE) argues the EU’s efforts 
to achieve its other goals in space like the promotion of the European space industry and 
maximizing the economic and societal benefits of space for Europe “will be undermined unless 
the EU… [takes] a stronger role on the world stage” (European Commission 2016, p. 11).The 
strategy states that Europe should promote international cooperation and lead the “building the 
global governance or appropriate legal frameworks for space” (European Commission 2016, p. 
11). The promotion of normative and governance frameworks in space aims to achieve both 
physical security for European space systems and long-term autonomous access to the commons 
of Earth orbit. It is also consistent with Maull’s third criterion for civilian power, as is the 
emphasis on economic means. 
Promoting European space industry 
Economic goals and means enjoy a place of prominence in the Commission’s space strategy. 
The Commission frames space policy as industrial policy within the context of the single market. 





trade policy and geopolitical component. As previously discussed, The SSE opens with an 
overview of the size of the European space industry, referencing the jobs the industry supports as 
well as its share of the global market for competitive comparison (2016, p. 2). After establishing 
the link between space services and economic prosperity, the Commission lays out its plan of 
action to support the space industry: 
“The Commission will support European space entrepreneurs in starting and scaling up 
across the single market, for example by exploring a 'first-client' approach. It will also 
promote access to finance for space in the context of the Investment Plan for Europe and 
Union funding programmes.” (European Commission 2016, p. 7) 
 
Increased public investment in the space sector, the Commission argues, will not only create jobs 
in the space industry itself but generate knock-on effects in other areas as well. The exploitation 
of space data and services in other sectors should yield efficiency gains and help spur growth. 
In addition to public investment, the Commission also promises the space industry favorable 
regulatory conditions: 
“The emergence of a business- and innovation-friendly ecosystem will also be supported 
at European, regional and national levels by establishing space hubs that bring together 
the space, digital and user sectors” (European Commission 2016, p. 7)  
 
This statement is also consistent with domestic industrial policy, in which states or sub-national 
governments grant businesses regulatory concessions in the hopes of spurring economic activity. 
That aligns with Wendt’s economic well-being national interest, filtered through the EU’s 
internal role as a common market. However, boosting space capabilities is not merely a jobs 
program in the Commission’s eyes, but also has international political implications. 
On the international level, Commission justifies the necessity of support for the European 
space industry as part of the broader drive for autonomy in space.  
“Europe needs to maintain and further strengthen its world-class capacity to conceive, 
develop, launch, operate and exploit space systems. To ensure this, the Commission will 






Alongside appeals to the domestic economic and social benefits from space systems, the 
Commission also frames the space industry in a context of international competition, in which 
Europe must not fall behind or lose ‘its world-class capacity’. Parallel to its internal efforts, the 
Commission promises to “seek to establish a level playing field for European industry” using “its 
trade policy instruments and economic diplomacy” (European Commission 2016, p. 11). The EU 
often uses its economic weight in pursuit of its interests on the world stage. The size of the 
common market allows the EU to impose product and labor standards well beyond its borders, 
requirements which it often formalizes s in free trade agreements. The export of norms with trade 
is best summarized in the German expression ‘Wandel durch Handel’ (change through trade) and 
exemplifies the concretization of the EU’s ‘civilizing’ efforts abroad through civilian, primarily 
economic means. 
Thus, economic means subsidies and the promotion of an industry-friendly regulatory 
environment become tied to the interests of autonomy and self-esteem/prestige necessary to 
maintain the role of global player in addition to the direct interest in economic well-being.  
Increased investment in space systems  
For both material and institutional reasons, the EU is limited in the hard power capabilities 
directly at its disposal. The EU sees the dual-use nature of space technologies as an opportunity 
apply civilian and commercial assets for security and defense purposes through ‘synergies’ 
(European Commission 2016). These synergies should both promote domestic industries 
(economic security) within Europe on the production side and provide an expanded toolkit for 
policymakers as end-users (security from space/space assets as security providers). While other 





ensuring the security of their space assets (security in space) (DOD 2018; White House 2017), 
the EU relies on norm promotion and international agreements (Mutschler and Venet 2012).  
The Commission aims to increase the defense benefits from space along with the economic 
ones by increasing the EU’s footprint in Earth orbit. The goal of investment in EU space systems 
and their associated industries is to increase the returns from space for security programs like 
Galileo and Copernicus by exploiting the dual-use nature of earth observation and positioning 
capabilities. This allows civilian systems to contribute to the physical security of the Union and 
increases the EU’s autonomy as a military actor. 
The Commission also proposed creating an EU Agency for the Space Programme to place all 
the supranational space assets under one roof and fund new ‘security components’ including an 
SSA initiative, which was adopted by the Parliament and Council. SSA is crucial to the physical 
security of space systems, and consequently, the benefits they provide. Currently, European SSA 
capabilities are managed by a consortium of member states with participation of the 
intergovernmental SatCen. Despite the relative underdevelopment of EU capabilities for security 
in space, the Union is taking active steps both as an intergovernmental coordinator and at the 
supranational level to enhance its hard power capabilities. In doing so, it is positioning itself to 
be more than a ‘norm entrepreneur,’ but a full-fledged space power in its own right (Mutschler 
and Venet 2012).  
The Commission promotes investment in SSA capabilities among the member states and acts 
as a coordinator between them to reduce reliance on the United States, which is the chief 
provider of SSA services internationally. The goal is not to diminish cooperation with partners 
like the US, but to move the EU from a position of being a net importer to a net exporter of 





can be entirely autarkic and still maintain reliable data on objects in orbit. Through expanding its 
and its member states’ capabilities, the Commission seeks to position the EU as a responsible 
partner in space and a contributor to global collective security. 
Conclusion 
The space policy approaches the Commission lays out in its Space Industrial Strategy and the 
Space Strategy for Europe often address multiple of Wendt’s national interests. The preference 
for norm promotion and economic means demonstrates a role performance consistent with the 
Union’s role identity as a civilian power. Efforts to maintain and increase the EU’s autonomy in 
space show the Commission’s ambition for the Union to act in accordance with its self-
perception as a global player. The Commission’s strategy and funding proposals demonstrate the 
desire and the will to for the EU to perform its context-specific roles as a space actor on the 
world stage consistently with its meta role identities. In the next section, I examine how the 
Commission instrumentalizes the EU’s role identities to justify increased supranational 






CHAPTER 5: SPACE AND THE COMMISSION 
Thus far, I have examined how the Commission frames the ends and means of EU space 
policy through the lens of Wendt’s four national interests and the EU’s meta role identities as a 
civilian power and a global player. Under Wendt’s constructivist framework, the investigation 
would stop here. The nation (or the supranational level of the EU in my case) is the level of 
analysis and some aspects of national identity are pre-social, hence the ‘rump materialist’ aspects 
of ‘objective’ national interests. Given the EU’s unique institutional nature, however, I believe a 
look under the hood at intra-EU discursive dynamics is warranted. The EU does not have the 
same foundational legitimacy as a space actor which a national government has. Instead, the 
basis for supranational space competencies had to be rhetorically constructed. The internal basis 
of that construction has implications for the EU’s external role identity and role performance, 
and therefore deserves attention. 
Schmidt’s (2008) formulation of discursive institutionalism (DI) argues for setting “ideas and 
discourse in an institutional context…. [putting] ideas into their ‘meaning context’” and taking 
“take a more dynamic view of change, in which ideas and discourse overcome obstacles” (p. 
304). I apply Schmidt’s framework in this section to examine the Commission’s use of language, 
in particular its instrumentalization of EU role identities, to explain how it legitimized the 






As in previous sections, I focus here on Commission documents, but I now turn my analysis 
to how the Commission justifies the Europeanization of space policy. Ryan (2019) argues that 
the Commission bases the legitimacy of space policy supranationalization on the increasingly 
political and strategic relevance of space activities, making an appeal to the democratic 
legitimacy of the European Parliament. In discussing the division of governance in European 
space policy between the EU, ESA, and member states, Ryan writes: 
“The claims to legitimacy of EU action in the field of space are, it is generally 
stated, advanced by reference to Article 189. However, I suggest that such claims to the 
primacy of this legitimacy, over and above that of the ESA, are advanced by reference to 
the democratic legitimacy of the EU (via the European Parliament) to act for, that is, in 
the interest of, the citizens of the European Union…. The EU has a moral, as well as a 
political, mandate to act…. Asserting the political nature of the EU as an actor directs 
attention to the demos. So, while authors have characterized the arrangement as 
unchanging… I suggest that the appeal to its political character is indicative of 
positioning of the EU as the driver, as the only captain of the European space policy.” 
(2019, p. 173) 
 
Per Ryan, the Commission ties the EU’s supranational ‘captaincy’ of space policy to the 
democratic legitimacy of the European Parliament. She bases this claim on the invocation of the 
demos through the emphasis on emergent political relevance of space and cites Commission 
Communication from 2012: 
[R]elations between the EU and ESA are affected by the asymmetry regarding political 
accountability. The fact that the ESA as a European agency has no formal link with the 
European Parliament deprives the ESA of the direct link with citizens that any EU policy 
enjoys. (European Commission 2012, p 4; cited in Ryan 2019, p. 168) 
 
As space policy has moved from a ‘technical realm’ to a political one, per this line of reasoning, 
only the EU as a supranational actor could claim to represent the interests of a common 
European demos. The Commission argues that “the ESA is not a political actor” and therefore 





discourse of the EU… emphasises the need for coherence with “EU values,” which would be 
impossible through a merely technocratic intergovernmental organization like ESA (Ryan 2019, 
p. 157). 
Oikonomou (2019), meanwhile, takes a critical class-based approach to analyzing the 2016 
SSE, writing: 
“The primary argument articulated here is that the orientation of the document is a solid 
reflection of the needs of internationalised European space manufacturers and has indeed 
come about due to the activities of the industry as a space policy actor. In other words, 
the economic priorities of the European space industry are the key actor in the authoring 
of the Strategy.” (2019, p. 35).  
 
In Oikonomou’s understanding, the primacy of economic interests in the SSE does not represent 
an underlying civilian character to the EU as a space actor. In fact, the EU itself is not the 
primary actor at all but rather the space industry. The Commission merely gives voice to and 
formalizes the interests of European space capitalists. Oikonomou argues that there was no 
objective need or existing market for space capabilities in Europe and that the Commission 
created one in service of industry. 
Both analyses provide useful insights into possible means and motivations for the 
Commission’s framing of space. I align my approach with Ryan, assuming the Commission aims 
to assert supranational ‘hegemony’ over European space policy. Oikonomou’s approach employs 
a different level of analysis and is too dismissive of the strategic benefits of space capabilities for 
the EU. Instead of examining appeals to democratic or political legitimacy, I focus on the 
Commission’s instrumentalization of neofunctionalist language – emphasizing spillover effects 





The Commission’s Discursive Strategy 
Commission documents repeatedly appeal to the need to avoid market fragmentation, using 
familiar rationalist justifications for integration. 
“National legislation alone will not ensure a coherent coverage of space-related legal 
issues and a harmonised legal framework for all Member States. An inconsistent legal 
framework may negatively affect the functioning of the internal market. It may therefore 
be necessary to take steps towards the establishment of a coherent EU space regulatory 
framework” (European Commission 2013, p. 11) 
 
Even absent the threat of international competition or threats to European autonomy, in the 
Commission’s framing it is still imperative to make space industry regulations as harmonized 
and coherent as possible. This applies existing internal market logics, where suprational 
competencies are well established, to an industry many countries consider critical to their 
defense, and thereby their sovereignty. Rather than being a new policy area requiring a new 
framework, the Commission frames space as a market in which the existing internal market 
approaches have yet to be fully applied. Deemphasizing the defense-related aspects of space 
capabilities internally and emphasizing them externally, the Commission creates a shared EU 
autonomy detached from potential member state ambitions to be autonomous from one another. 
In 2018, the Commission advanced its space Europeanization agenda with a proposal to 
create an EU space program. The Parliament and Council adopted most of the Commission’s 
proposals, establishing the new Agency for the European Space Programme (EUSPA) in May 
2021. EUSPA houses the flagship EU space programs Galileo, Copernicus, and EGNOS under 
one roof and contains new supranational components for governmental satellite communications 
(GOVSATCOM) and space surveillance and tracking (SST). The Commission grounded its 






“The proposal for a Regulation significantly simplifies and streamlines the existing 
Union acquis by combining in a single text and harmonising almost all rules that were 
hitherto contained in separate Regulations or Decisions. This raises the profile of the 
Union space policy, which is in line with the major role that the Union intends to play in 
future as a global player in space.” (European Commission 2018, p. 3) 
 
Defending the necessity and appropriateness of agglomerating space policy competency at the 
Union level, the Commission cites “positive spillover effects”, a term taken from 
neofunctionalist theory, across the EU economy, which will fuel prosperity and technological 
competitiveness (2018, p. 4). Justifying why the space program’s aims could not be 
accomplished among the member states, the Commission argues that the costs of space activity 
are too high for any single member to bear alone, adding, “Such are the scale and ramifications 
of the proposed Regulation’s aims that they can only be properly achieved by action at Union 
level” (2018, p. 5). Of course, the Commission has the initiative to define the scale and 
ramifications of its proposed regulation, and therefore willingly chose a scope for which only 
Union level action could be sensible. The broader discursive context of global ambition and the 
internalized role of the EU as a global player makes the Commission’s framing here possible. 
The Commission instrumentalizes neofunctionalist logic justifying supranationalization based on 
‘rational’ needs and positive spillovers to reify EU actorness both internally and on the world 
stage through space policy. This new reframing recasts space policy, historically a member state 
competency, coordinated through technocratic intergovernmental cooperation, as a core political 
activity at the Union level.  
A tangible institutional marker pointing toward a space policy fait accompli by the 
Commission is the inclusion of SST in EUSPA. EU SST was established in 2014 as a framework 
for cooperation among member states, which retain ownership and operation of the sensor 





of their SSA capabilities but adds a new EU-level budget and governance component. The 
Commission was previously responsible for managing the applications of new participating 
member states to the consortium and acquired observer status on the EU SST steering committee 
(Peldszus and Faucher 2020, p. 890-1). It also argued for the adoption of qualified majority 
voting within the consortium, which the members adopted (European Commission 2018, p. 7; 
Peldszus and Faucher 2020, p. 891). Most significantly, EU SST going forward will comprise the 
SSA component of the EU space program, for which the Commission has “overall 
responsibility” and the power to “determine the main technical and operational requirements 
necessary to implement systems and services evolution” (European Council 2021, p. 21). The 
acceptance of Commission oversight in an area previously governed by informal 
intergovernmental cooperation provides an example of the discursive power of the 
Commission’s rhetorical binding of space capabilities to the EU’s role identities.  
Conclusion 
A constructivist analysis of Commission space strategy documents allows us to infer the 
role(s) it envisions for the EU on the international level. However, it does not reveal where these 
identities come from or how they were constructed. Delving into the intra-EU institutional level 
enables an explanation for the construction and evolution of the EU as a space power. Through a 
mix of rationalist appeals to policy streamlining, simplification, and positive spillover effects 
plus the promise of status and a shared autonomy on the world stage, the Commission 
legitimized the supranational level as the appropriate arena for crafting and conducting space 
policy in the EU. The self-conception of state-like status for the EU in space I asserted in the first 





the extent the EU is ‘a space actor under construction,’ the Commission is a key player in 







The EU’s meta role identities as a civilian power and a global player inform the ends and 
means of its approach to space. Both the Union’s interests and the strategy by which it pursues 
them have a civilian character with an emphasis on norm promotion and economic competition. 
Space policy also serves as a project to reify a common EU identity both institutionally through 
the creation of supranational agencies and materially through the development of autonomous 
launch capabilities and satellite services. Beyond autonomy, the Commission seeks to position 
the EU in a leadership position as a space power, especially through shaping norms and 
providing space services. The alter perceptions of the EU as a civilian or normative leader in 
space are an aspect of the EU’s identity as a space actor this paper has left unexplored. My 
examination of Commission documents provides a content analysis of how the Commission 
understands EU interests in space, as well as how it justifies supranationalization of space policy 
competency on the basis of a shared Union-wide identity. The narrow focus on the Commission 
perspective, however, ignores the interinstitutional and international bargaining which also shape 
interest formation and articulation. 
Within the EU, the Commission has pursued a discursive strategy to position the 
supranational level of the Union as the central and legitimate field for crafting European space 
policy. The Commission justified the Europeanization of space policy through neofunctionalist 
framing of streamlining and spillover, as well as the promise of increased stature on the world 





emphasis in an increasingly competitive global environment of securing ‘European’ autonomy. 
The practical extent to which it has succeeded in placing itself in a supranational captain’s chair 
for European space policy remains an open question for further study. Key measures to address 
that question could include a comparative study of budgets for space activities at the Union level 
and among the member states. A process tracing approach examining member state space 
strategies in relation to Commission strategy documents could establish evidence for a causal 
direction of influence, either from the member states to the Commission, vice versa, or some 
more complicated bidirectional relationship. A similar approach could examine feedback effects 
between international acceptance or rejection of EU norm-entrepreneurship in space and the 
centrality of norm promotion to EU space strategy. 
In such a competitive environment, the EU’s identities as a civilian power and global player 
may increasingly come into conflict going forward. Commission President von der Leyen and 
High Representative Borrell have both expressed geopolitical ambitions, stating “Europe must 
learn the language of power,”9 and diminish its reliance on solely soft power means. In her 
foreword to the EU’s 2016 Global Strategy, then High Representative Mogherini chafed at the 
classification of the EU as a civilian power, pointing out the Union’s multiple ongoing CSDP 
operations (EEAS 2016, p. 4). Maull’s definition, however, does not preclude the use of military 
force, so long as it is for ‘civilizing’ purposes, such as protecting human rights or collective 
defense. Nevertheless, a change in tone could mark the prelude to a change in policy substance, 
and ultimately a shift in role identity toward becoming a more normal power comfortable with 
 
9 “Von der Leyen: ‘Europe must learn the language of power,’” DW News. Deutsche Welle, Nov. 6, 2019, 
https://www.dw.com/en/von-der-leyen-europe-must-learn-the-language-of-power/a-51172902. (accessed May 
18, 2021); “Hearing with High Representative/Vice President-designate Josep Borrell,” Press Releases. European 
Parliament, Oct. 7, 2019, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190926IPR62260/hearing-





deploying hard power resources in pursuit of self-serving relative gains. The identities and 
positions of the various member states, left here unexamined, also merit further study for their 
content and impact on EU space policy. Within the EU, member states exert considerable 
influence over the Common Foreign and Security Policy through the European Council and the 
Council of the EU. Intergovernmental defense initiatives   such as Permanent Structured 
Cooperation (PESCO) or cooperation between the Commission and member states like the 
European Defence Fund (EDF) also contain space elements and provide avenues for member 
states to influence overall EU space security strategy. Non-EU intergovernmental bodies, in 
particular NATO, also play a key role in the bloc’s security. NATO, which has considerable 
overlap in member states with the EU, is developing its own approach to space. Coordination 
and competition between NATO and the EU and their respective members will undoubtedly play 
a shaping role in future EU space policy and strategy. 
Space powers’ civilian and commercial space programs are often byproducts of initial efforts 
to develop military technologies. At the Union level of the EU, this dynamic is reversed with the 
Commission promoting synergies to allow the use of civilian assets for security and defense 
applications. If the EU’s efforts at normative leadership in space falter and the international 
community at large or other space-faring nations spurn the EU’s efforts at norm-
entrepreneurship, the EU’s status as a normative power in space will erode. In such a scenario, 
the incentives to foster the domestic space industry would likely remain, potentially leading the 
EU to pursue its narrow self-interest in space. Following role theory’s precepts, the result of 
contradictions in ego and alter perceptions would result in a role shift. Thus, the EU may over 
time lose its civilian identity in space and reach convergence with other space powers having 





‘normal’ space powers among the member states with more assertive military stances, such as 
France and Italy, deserves further enquiry.  
Whether such a shift will occur remains to be seen and depends on the dynamics of the 
broader international environment and the salience of EU-level defense autonomy within the 
Union. Regardless, the EU has established itself as a unique space power. Understanding the 
EU’s identity and institutional structure will continue to be crucial to understanding its behavior 
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